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Williams: The Florida Constitution and Legislative Classification for Tax A
NOTES

THE FLORIDA CONSTITUTION AND LEGISLATIVE
CLASSIFICATION FOR TAX ASSESSMENT
PURPOSES
The designation by the Florida Legislature of agricultural lands
as a distinct class of property to be the recipient of special and
favorable treatment in ad valorem tax assessment procedures' has
prompted litigation challenging the statute as a violation of the
Florida constitutional requirement that a uniform and equal rate
of taxation be applied to a just valuation of all property. 2 The agricultural classification was upheld by the Florida Supreme Court in a
four-to-three decision in Tyson v. Lanier.3 Since the Tyson decision,
the legislature has revised the general assessment scheme by essentially
abandoning the "full cash value" language of the previous assessment
statute 4 and substituting "just valuation." 5
The impact of these two events leaves the law in a confused state,
and an examination of the constitutional and statutory provisions in
light of the court decisions is believed to be in order.
The social and economic policy factors underlying agricultural
classification, the controversial general tax assessment practices prevalent throughout the state, and the procedural and remedial difficulties
that face litigants complaining of unequal tax burdens will not be
considered in this note. These problems are dealt with at length in
recent issues of the University of FloridaLaw Review.6 The scope of
this note is limited to a consideration of the constitutional objections
to legislation granting more favorable assessment standards to one
designated class of property than is imposed generally on other property, assuming both standards are ideally applied.
There are two commonly accepted principles that must be kept in
mind as a base from which to consider the constitutional and statutory
assessment requirements. The first of these principles is that the
value of real property is at least partially dependent upon the use to
which it may be put. This principle may be illustrated by a hypothetical tract of land that is suitable either as a shopping center site
or as an agricultural plot. It is obvious that desirability for commercial usage would have a definite effect upon the value of the land.
Under an assessment scheme that prohibited consideration of the
1.

FLA. STAT. §193.11 (3) (1963).

2.

FLA. CONsr. art. IX, §1.

3. 156 So. 2d 833 (Fla. 1963).
4. Fla. Laws 1907, ch. 5596, §6, at 5.
5. FLA.STAT. §193.021 (1963).
6. Wershow, Ad Valorem Taxation and Its Relationship to Agricultural Land
Tax Problems in Florida, 16 U. FLA. L. REv. 521 (1964); Wershow, Agricultural
Zoning in Florida-Its Implications and Problems, 13 U. FLA. L. Ruv. 479 (1960);
Note, 17 U. FLA. L. Rav. 83 (1964).
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lands' utility as a commercial site, the valuation attained would almost certainly be lower than a scheme that allowed consideration of
all relevant factors affecting value. The other principle to be kept in
mind is that the tax burden is the interrelation of the millage rate and
ratio of assessment value to the full value of the property. When
an unequal ratio of assessment value to full value results from application of different assessment standards to different classes of
property, and the same millage rate is applied, the effective tax rates
imposed must also be unequal. Therefore, in order for a uniform
and equal effective rate of taxation to result, the assessment valuations
must be comparable if the same millage rate is to be applied.
The pertinent constitutional and statutory provisions as they now
stand are as follows:
Florida Constitution, article IX, section 1. Uniform and equal
rate of taxation; special rates- The Legislature shall provide
for a uniform and equal rate of taxation, except that it may
provide for special rate or rates on intangible property ....
and shall prescribe such regulations as shall secure a just valuation of all property, both real and personal, excepting such
property as may be exempted by law for municipal, education,
literary, scientific, religious or charitable purposes.
Florida Statutes, section 193.021 (1963). [The county assessors]
. . . shall assess all the real and personal property in such a
manner as to secure a just valuation as required by §1, Art.
IX of the state constitution. In arriving at a just valuation, the
county assessor of taxes of the several counties shall take into
consideration the following factors:
(1) The present cash value of the property;
(2) The highest and best use to which the property can
be expected to be put in the immediate future; and the present
use of the property;
(3) The location of said property;
(4) The quantity or size of said property;
(5) The cost of said property and the present replacement
value of any improvements thereon;
(6) The condition of said property;
(7) The income from said property.
Florida Statutes, section 193.11 (3) (1963). All lands being
used for agricultural purposes shall be assessed as agricultural
lands upon an acreage basis, regardless of the fact that any
or all of said lands are embraced in a plat of a subdivision
or other real estate development ....
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THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF "JUST VALUATION"

Prior to enactment of section 193.021, in 1963, the statutory standard set out for tax assessors was "full cash value."' This standard was
held to be synonymous with the constitutional "just value" requirement by the supreme court in Tyson v. Lanier.8 "Fair market value,"
the equivalent of the term "full cash value" in the opinion of the
attorney general, 9 has been defined by the court as "the amount of
money which a purchaser willing but not obliged to buy the property
would pay an owner willing but not obliged to sell it, taking into
consideration all uses to which the property is adapted and might
in reason be applied."'10 Notwithstanding, Tyson, dealing with the
agricultural classification, held that "full cash value" determined
without consideration of all the reasonable uses to which the property
might be applied was consistent with the statutory requirement. The
majority opinion was based upon the premise that the legislature had
power to classify on the basis of actual use of the land and that, although just value and full cash value are synonymous, it is error to
interpret full cash value as value for any and all potential uses.:"
Justice Thornal's concurrence, which resulted in the four-to-three
12
majority, was based upon his dissenting opinion in Franks v. Davis
in which he subscribed to the view that the constitutional equal
rate of taxation requirement was separate and distinct from the
constitutional requirement of a just valuation of all property. 3 Thus,
if the legislature can classify property to be assessed on the basis
of actual use and comply with the constitutional mandate of just
valuation, the fact that such classification results in an unequal
effective tax rate becomes irrelevant. In the dissent, the necessary
interrelation between the assessment value and the tax rate was
recognized, and the resulting inequality from different assessment
standards was said to be tantamount to an unauthorized legislative
exemption of that portion of actual value attributable to other
4
reasonably susceptible uses.1
The new assessment plan, as devised by the legislature in Florida
Statutes, section 193.021, does not resolve the basic conflict represented by the Tyson decision. The listing of present cash value as
7. Fla. Laws 1907, ch. 5596, §6, at 5.
8. 156 So. 2d 833, 837 (Fa. 1963).
9. 1949-1950 FLA. ATr'Y GmN. BIENMAL REP. 223-234.
10. City of Tampa v. Colgan, 121 Fla. 218, 230, 163 So. 577, 582
(Emphasis added.)
11. 156 So. 2d at 837.
12. 145 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1962).
13. Id. at 232.
14. 156 So. 2d at 839, 840.
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merely one of the factors to be considered in determining "just value"
appears to be a definite legislative attempt to abolish the full cash
value standard of the previous assessment statute. If full cash value,
however, is synonymous with the constitutional standard as was held
in Tyson, the omission of the phrase from the statute cannot constitutionally eliminate the standard. In McNayr v. State ex rel. Du1pont Plaza Center, Inc.,15 the only case decided since the 1964 assessment statute became effective,16 the standard of assessment was not
directly in issue. In McNayr, the property was admittedly on the tax
rolls at fifty per cent of the just valuation that had been ascertained by
the tax assessor. The objection to such a procedure was that it had the
effect of doubling the homestead exemption and thereby eliminating
a number of parcels from taxation, which otherwise would have
been taxed. The court approved a writ of mandamus ordering the
doubling of the value on the tax rolls to coincide with just value in
a per curiam opinion. Justice Ervin, in a concurring opinion, referred with approval to the full cash value holding of Tyson.17 Regardless whether the objective "full cash value" standard or the
subjective "just value" standard of section 193.021 is to be applied,
however, the unequal application imposed under the new statutory
plan for agricultural land will still result in unequal effective rates of
taxation. The new scheme merely muddies the water by employing
the comparatively vague "just valuation" language under which
discrimination in favor of the agricultural classification is not quite
so obvious.
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STANDARD OF A "UNIFORM AND

EQUAL RATE OF TAXATION"

The underlying issue of the constitutionality of an assessment
classification that imposes a different assessment standard turns upon
construction of the constitutional provision guaranteeing a "uniform
and equal rate of taxation." As noted above, identical assessment
standards must be used if a uniform and equal effective tax rate is to
be attained. Analysis of the cases and opinions reveals three basic
conflicting constructions of this provision. The provision is construed as guaranteeing freedom from an unreasonable discrimination
in the effective rate of taxation by one group of justices and as re-

quiring an equal effective rate of taxation by another group.18 Both
15.

166 So. 2d 142 (Fla. 1964).

16. In Duval County litigation was brought against the tax assessor in which
it is believed the circuit court interpreted §193.021 as requiring assessment at full
cash value. The opinion is unreported and the case is pending appeal.

17.

166 So. 2d 142, 145-46 (Fla. 1964).

18.

See majority and dissenting opinions, Tyson v. Lanier, 156 So. 2d 833 (Fla.
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theories seemed to be applied in Franks v. Davis when the court struck
down a legislative classification of stock in trade that called for assessment at twenty-five per cent of invoice cost.' 9 The majority opinion
stated that if tax rates could not be varied directly under the constitution, they could not be varied indirectly by manipulation of the
assessment basis upon which the tax rate is applied;20 a holding
directly in line with a construction requiring an equal effective tax
rate. The opinion, however, further stated that the assessment classification was not based upon any reasonable relati6nship to the just
or true value of the property - an indication that reasonable variances
in assessment valuations would be permissible.21 Thus, the question
whether a reasonable manipulation of assessment standards would
be unconstitutional was left substantially unresolved. In Justice
Thornal's dissent the third interpretation was advanced. The requirements of a uniform and equal rate of taxation and that of a
just valuation of all property were said to be independent of each
other, and a legislative assessment classification should not be disturbed as long as it is a reasonable one and does not discriminate
within the class. 22 This is the rationale Justice Thornal adopted in
the concurring opinion that was necessary to uphold the agricultural
classification in the Tyson case.
For the equal rate provision to be separable, as Justice Thornal
suggests, it must be construed as containing an inherent equal assessment requirement. To hold otherwise would render the clause
substantially meaningless since the tax burden could be freely manipulated by varying the assessment valuation to which the rate is applied. This interpretation leaves the just valuation provision as
merely a mandate to the legislature to prescribe appropriate regulations for all property and theoretically allows free legislative classification as long as an equal burden is imposed on each class. The
difficulty with such a construction is that the constitutional language
requires an equal rate except that special rates may be provided for
intangible property.2 3 This specific exception strongly implies that all
other classes of property are included within the equal rate category.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. This implication is also consistent with the unchallenged declaration that the over-all purpose of
the provision is to secure equality of ad valorem tax burden.24 Further, in four of five states with similar constitutional provisions, uni1963).
19.

145 So. 2d 228 (Fla. 1962).

20. Id. at 231.
21.

Ibid.

22. Id. at 232, 233.
23. FLA. CONsT. art. IX, §1.
24. Camp Phosphate Co. v. Allen, 77 Fla. 341, 350, 81 So. 503, 506 (1919).
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versal application of an equal effective rate of taxation to all prop25
erty is said to be required.
If, as the majority and dissenting opinions in Tyson seem to agree,
the uniform and equal rate provision applies to all but the specifically
excepted class of intangible property, is an interpretation that allows
reasonable legislative discrimination through manipulation of the
assessment structure tenable? The majority opinion in Tyson in
effect construes the provision to guarantee that an unreasonable unequal tax rate shall not be applied. Such a construction endows the
constitutional guarantee with all the indefiniteness inherent in the
subjective test of reasonableness. It is true that the determination of
any value is itself adorned with value judgments that can only be
tested by reasonableness, and that discrepancies in valuations are inevitable, but these are necessary evils. It does not seem reasonable,
however, that legislation of discrepancies into the tax burden by imposition of different assessment standards was intended. It has been
held that article IX, section 1 was designed to provide for an equal ad
valorem tax burden. 26 Dual assessment standards guarantee that this
purpose will not be accomplished. The constitution is the only permissible source of a tax exemption, but legislative suppression of
valuations is comparable to such an exemption. This is the very thing
the court condemned in Franksv. Davis and again in McNayr v. State
ex rel. Dupont Plaza Center, Inc. The merits of the conflicting constructions when viewed from a policy standpoint are not controlling.
The constitutional guarantee under consideration is not comparable
to the due process guarantee, which expands to fit the changing times,
rather it is one in which the guarantee itself will be compromised
by liberal construction. When a constitutional mandate such as
this is issued the proper way to effect a change in the policy so expressed is by constitutional amendment. To be sure, the legislature
will continue to be brought under pressure to enact legislation for
the benefit of special interests, and these efforts will sometimes be
rewarded. 27 The benefits received from any individual legislation may
be worthwhile and substantial, however, Justice Drew's observation
in his dissent in Tyson that the "list is endless" of taxpayers who can
claim with justification a pressing need for special consideration in

25.

NEWHOUSE,

CONSTITUTIONAL

UNIFORMITY AND

EQUALITY

IN STATE

TAXATION

653-54 (1959).
26. Camp Phosphate Co. v. Allen, supra note 24.
27. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. §200.08(4) (1963) (in which the legislature changed
the method by which stock in trade would receive beneficial treatment after the
previous method was struck down in Franks v. Davis); FLA. STAT. §200.08 (2) (1963)
(concerning household goods and personal effects); FLA. STAT. §193.201 (1963) (the
"green-belt" law).
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tax assessments, 28 should not go without notice. The implications are
obvious. Further legislative classification could leave the entire ad
valorem system in a chaotic condition. Although ordinarily the only
limitation on the legislature's power is that it not be exercised in an
arbitrary, unreasonable, and unjustly discriminatory fashion, there
should be no legislative power to compromise a constitutional guarantee. To hold otherwise opens the door to the very thing the constitution was designed to prohibit.
CONCLUSION

The conflict over the authority of the legislature to specify that a
class of property be assessed differently than other classes of property
is traceable to divergent interpretations of article I, section 9 of the
Florida Constitution. Prior to enactment of the new statutory assessment scheme, the standard was said to be "full cash value," both by
statute and constitutional requirement. The question whether
the constitution required full cash value for all purposes for all
property was resolved in favor of a dual "full cash value" standard
that allows different assessment techniques for different legislative
classifications by the four-to-three decision in Tyson. The apparent
abandonment of any full cash value concept by the legislature in the
1964 assessment plan has merely created confusion as to the standard
to be applied. Language in a concurring opinion in Dupont Plaza
Center indicates the full cash value standard may still be with us.
Regardless of the standard applied, however, the underlying issue
still remains as long as there is an unequal effective rate of taxation.
The construction adopted by the dissenting opinion in Tyson that
the constitution guarantees a uniform and equal effective rate of
taxation is believed to be the proper interpretation. This construction not only meets the test of reasonableness, but is the only construction that is completely consistent with the language of the constitution. In addition, this construction is consistent with the long
expressed view that the purpose of the provision is to effect equality
of tax burdens, both directly and indirectly, through the exemption
restrictions imposed by the constitution. Due to the close three-way
division of the court uncertainty will prevail that can only be solved
by litigation, an unfortunate result for an area of the law with such
widespread importance. When the question is presented again, it is
the writer's belief that the court should adopt the strict interpretation
of the uniform and equal tax rate guarantee as represented by the
dissent in Tyson v. Lanier.
CHARLES A. WILLIAMS, JR.
28.

156 So. 2d 833, 841 (Fla. 1963).
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EDITOR'S NOTE

The following three student works are concerned with recent developments in the field of Criminal Law. Primarily because of the
United States Supreme Court decisions that have expanded the constitutional rights of an accused in criminal proceedings, the administration of criminal justice is presently a matter of great interest and
concern to both lawyer and layman.
The note, Florida's Criminal Rule of Procedure Number One,
categorizes the cases decided since the promulgation of the rule. The
United States Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,
guaranteeingan accused indigent the right to counsel, was responsible
for promulgation of the rule. By exploring the situations that have
been held to be a deprivation of the right to counsel, the basis for a
substantive definition of the right has been presented. The note also
explores other procedural ramifications of the rule.
The case comment on Fish v. State and Harvey v. State develop
the question whether the Gideon guarantee to counsel extends to
misdemeanor proceedings.
The case comment on Escobedo v. State of Illinois discusses the
question of where the right to counsel attaches in a criminal proceeding.
Thus, the University of Florida Law Review has attempted to cast
some light on what the right to counsel is, who is entitled to that
right, and where in the proceeding it attaches. All three of these
areas remain unsettled; it has been our purpose to set forth the
present state of the law with the hope that this presentation may provide a foundation for a better understandingof future development.
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